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NOTES
Birth Control as a Condition of
Probation-A New Weapon in the War
against Child Abuse
INTRODUCTION
"Childhood is the kingdom where nobody dies."'
Estimates indicate that between 1000 and 2000 children are
fatally abused each year, and these numbers are increasing. 2 The
true horror of these statistics is that often a child's death is the
result of abuse or neglect perpetrated by the child's parents.' Due
to recent media coverage of some particularly offensive instances
of abuse,4 public outrage and demand for prevention have signifi-
cantly intensified.5 As a result, courts have exhibited increasing
' EDNA ST. VINcENT MNLLAY, Childhood is the Kingdom Where Nobody Dies, in
Wn FROM THESE GRAPEs 20 (1934).
2 A study by the United States Department of Health and Human Services indicates
that 1100 children died of abuse in 1986. See U.S. DE,'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERrs.,
STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHmD ABUsE AND NEGLECT: 1988, at
3-10 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDy]. The study, however, recognizes that these statistics
are minimum estimates. See id. at 7-2. Anne Cohn, Executive Director of the National
Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse, has stated that as many as 2000 children die
each year from abuse, and that the numbers are on the rise. See Child Abuse: What We
Know About Prevention Strategies: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children,
Youth and Families, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 10 (1984) (statement of Anne Cohn).
I A study of age-related violent deaths of children in Cook County, Illinois, found
that if the child was younger than five years old, the perpetrator was usually a parent of the
victim. See Katherine K. Christoffel et al., Age-Related Patterns of Violent Death, Cook
County, Illinois, 1977 Through 1982, 143 AM. J. DEAs S CmuDEN 1403, 1406 (1989).
Moreover, of the 437 cases studied, approximately one third of the victims were under one
year and almost half were younger than two years. See id. Although the study analyzed only
violent death of children in Cook County, its results correspond to contemporary patterns
of violence. See Katherine K. Christoffel, Child Homicide in the United States: The Road
to Prevention, in CoPiNG wrm FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSpEcTrV 310,
312 (Gerald T. Hotaing et al. eds., 1988); NATIONAL STMUY, supra note 2, at 5-15.
4 See, e.g., George Hacket et al., A Tale of Abuse, NEwswEEK, Dec. 12, 1988, at 56-
61 (discussing the beating death of Lisa Steinberg).
I See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, Panel Calls Child Abuse A National Emergency, L.A.
Thems, June 27, 1990, at A12.
1037
1038 KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAl [VOL. 80
readiness to prevent child abuse and protect the victims of abuse. 6
One novel response is the imposition of birth control7 as a condition
of probation for parents found guilty of abusing their children.8
The California case People v. Johnson,9 also known as the
"Norplant case," has brought the imposition of birth control as a
condition of probation to national attention. 10 Although no appel-
late court has upheld the validity of imposing birth control as a
condition of probation," the requirement is constitutionally defen-
sible.'
2
6 See, e.g., E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("The strong
governmental interest in taking immediate action to protect the child justifies the immediate
investigation and points up the fact that other delayed methods [meeting a probable cause
standard for obtaining a search warrant] will likely hinder the government purpose-protec-
tion of the dependent child."), aff'd, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986); State v. Boggess, 340
N.W.2d 516, 526 (Wis. 1983) (Day, J., concurring) ("We should not permit the Bill of Rights
to be twisted into becoming a 'Bill of Wrongs' in the perception of the victims of crime.
The shield protecting our civil liberties should not be refabricated into a cloak to hide and
protect the child abuser in this case.").
7 "Birth control" as used in this Note refers generally to prohibiting procreation
regardless of the specific method, if any, prescribed.
8 See, e.g., State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. 1989) (holding that parole condition
prohibiting defendant from becoming pregnant unduly infringed on her right to privacy).
9 No. 29390 (Super. Ct., Tulare Cty., Jan. 2, 1991), appeal docketed, No. F015316
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Jan. 23, 1991) (scheduled for oral argument Apr. 17, 1992).
Darlene Johnson, a single mother of five children, was convicted of child abuse. The trial
judge conditioned probation on her consenting to a surgical implant of the Norplant birth
control device.
10 See, e.g., William Booth, Judge Orders Birth Control Implant in Defendant, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 5, 1991, § 1, at Al; Judge: Birth Control Implant Ruling Stands, Cm. Tim.,
Jan. 11, 1991, at 4; Desda Moss, Court-Ordered Birth Control Draws Fire, USA TODAY,
Jan. 10, 1991, at 2A; Mark A. Stein, Judge Stirs Debate with Ordering of Birth Control,
L.A. Ttm, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3; Woman in Abuse Case Agrees to Birth Control, N.Y.
Tsaos, Jan. 5, 1991, at A12.
" See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating condition
because less restrictive means not violative of defendant's constitutional rights were available);
Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (vacating condition because
future instances of child abuse had been foreclosed by other conditions of probation);
Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding condition prohibiting
marriage and pregnancy not reasonably related to future criminality because custody of minor
children was prohibited); Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (finding condition an intrusion on
privacy); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (invalidating
condition as unconstitutional). Trial courts have also attempted to impose birth control as a
condition of probation for a variety of other offenses. See People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal.
Rptr 290 (Ct. App. 1967) (second degree robbery); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (grand theft and battery); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct.
App. 1986) (forgery).
12 Contra Jack P. Lipton & Colin F. Campbell, The Constitutionality of Court-Imposed
Birth Control as a Condition of Probation, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 271 (1989)
(contending that court-imposed birth control as a condition of probation is unconstitutional).
1991-92] PROBATIONARY CONDITIONS 1039
Part I of this Note lays the framework for determining the
validity of probationary conditions that implicate constitutional
liberties. Part II sets out the manner in which appellate courts have
treated the imposition of birth control as a condition of probation.
Part III compares the probationer's interest in procreative liberty
with the state's interest in conditioning probation. The Note con-
cludes that the imposition of birth control as a condition of pro-
bation can represent a legitimate balance between a state's interest
in the protection of society and a probationer's right of procreative
liberty.
I. AN APPROACH TO CONDITIONING PROBATION
The trial judge has broad discretion to condition the terms of
probation.1 3 Several sources, however, offer guidance14 and
limitations15 on the exercise of this discretion. Generally, the con-
ditions of probation will not be overturned unless an appellate court
determines that the condition is not reasonably related to the crime
committed and to the prevention of future criminality.16 Tradition-
ally, the primary purpose of probation has been the defendant's
rehabilitation. 7 There are indications, however, that the trend is
toward expanding the permissible goals of probation. 8 It is impor-
tant to clarify the legitimate aims of probation because such goals
,1 See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1975)
("the trial judge has very broad discretion in fixing the terms and conditions of probation");
State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. 1985) ("[trial judges] are allowed a wide, but not
unlimited, discretion").
14 See MODEL PEa. CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); STANDARDs FOR
CRUMNAL JUSTICE § 2.3(e) (1980).
" Legislation may limit a court's discretion to impose probational conditions. See
generally Jeffery C. Filcik, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37
WASH. U. J. URn. & CoImaw. L. 291, 301-04 (1990) (listing the probation legislation of all
50 states). For the purposes of this Note, only jurisdictions that allow a trial court to impose
conditions in addition to statutory mandates are considered. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(20)
(1988) (stating that a federal court has discretion to impose condition of remaining at home
during non-working hours only as an alternative to incarceration); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-
11-204(1) to (2) (1986) (giving the court discretion to impose conditions besides statutorily
mandated ones).
," See generally People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967) (establishing
an analytical test to determine if a condition of probation is reasonably related to rehabili-
tation).
'1 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(explaining trial court's 'discretion to grant probation when offender is not likely to repeat
conduct if allowed to pursue rehabilitation while at liberty).
11 See generally Filcik, supra note 15, at 300 (noting that probation is evolving into "a
broad, flexible means of dispensing justice").
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ultimately affect whether a condition restricting constitutional lib-
erties is valid.
A. The "'Reasonably Related" Standard
Although courts have utilized different tests to determine whether
a condition of probation is reasonably related to the goals of
probation, 19 this Note will focus on the test set forth in People v.
Dominguez.2° In Dominguez, the trial court imposed upon the
defendant, an unmarried female with two children, who was con-
victed of second-degree robbery, the probational condition that she
"not... become pregnant without being married.1 21 To determine
the validity of the condition, the court established the following
test:
A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve
the statutory ends of probation and is invalid.Y
Using this test, the court resolved that the condition involved
was void because pregnancy is legal conduct bearing no relation to
either the crime committed or future criminality.23 Application of
the Dominguez test has caused considerable confusion. 4 As a result,
19 See generally Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment:
When Reasonableness is Not Enough, 17 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 45, 63-77 (1981).
Greenberg classifies these approaches into two categories: (1) facial reasonableness and (2)
analytical reasonableness. See id. The term "reasonableness" refers to what this Note labels
"reasonably related." Actually, the courts do not use any set nomenclature for this analysis.
Id. at 63. One commentator has termed the "reasonably related" test a "non-constitutional"
limitation on judicial discretion. See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67
CoLum. L. REv. 181, 191 (1967).
264 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967). The Dominguez test has been adopted by other
jurisdictions. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v.
Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976); State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595,
600 (S.D. 1977). Focusing on the Dominguez test is appropriate here because all of the cases
determining the validity of birth control as a condition of probation have, either explicitly
or implicitly, adopted that test. See supra note 11.
21 Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
22 Id. at 293. The probationer in Dominguez did not challenge the constitutionality of
the condition.
2See id.
24 People v. Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. 62, 64 (Ct. App. 1989). Bauer contends that the
confusion is the result of the California Supreme Court twice quoting the test in the
disjunctive, instead of the conjunctive. See id. at 65. Stated in the disjunctive, the test results
1040 [VOL. 80
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the California Supreme Court modified the Dominguez test. 2 Under
the modified test, a condition of probation that relates to legal
conduct is reasonably related if the condition either relates to the
previously committed crime or to future criminality.26 In addition
to satisfying a reasonably related test, a condition of probation that
implicates a constitutional27 liberty should be subjected to additional
scrutiny.
B. Additional Scrutiny-What Level?
It is generally held that a condition of probation may limit the
constitutional rights of a probationer.Y Courts and commentators
differ, however, regarding what level of additional scrutiny is re-
quired when constitutional liberties are involved. 29 In such a sce-
nario, California courts have explicitly stated that a decision utilizing
the modified Dominguez analysis requires a "second level of scru-
tiny," 30 imposing the additional requirement that the condition be
reasonable."'
1. The "'Reasonableness" Standard
The "reasonably related" test and the "reasonableness" test
differ in focus. In a reasonably related test, the focus is on the
in valid conditions only when the conditions either relate to the crime, or relate to criminal
conduct, or require conduct or prohibit conduct that is, in and of itself, related to future
criminality. Stated in the conjunctive, a court could invalidate a condition that was related
to the crime and to future criminality, but not related to criminal conduct. Bauer, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 65.
2 See People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975).
2Lent, 541 P.2d at 548; Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
27 For the purposes of this Note, "constitutional" refers to validity under the U.S.
Constitution.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1981) (restricting right
to travel); Young v. State, 692 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Ark. 1985) (restricting freedom of expres-
sion). But see State v. Simpson, 212 S.E.2d 566, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (declaring that a
condition of probation infringing a constitutional right is per se unreasonable).
2See, e.g., Filcik, supra note 15, at 311-18. In analyzing basically the same set of
cases presented here, the author concludes that "courts do not consider the constitutional
aspects of an imposed condition to determine its validity. Rather, courts employ a reasona-
bleness test." Id. at 318.
" Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
3 See People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 192 (Ct. App. 1978) ("Finally, the
constitution, the statute, all case law, demand and authorize 'reasonable' conditions, not just
conditions 'reasonably related' to the crime committed."). In Keller, the defendant's proba-
tion was conditioned on the defendant submitting to a search without a search warrant. See
id. at 186. The court held the condition unreasonable because the defendant was only
convicted of theft of a ball point pen. See id. at 193.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRRNAL
relationship between the condition imposed and the crime commit-
ted.32 However, in a reasonableness test, the question is whether
the condition is a reasonable means of achieving the ends of pro-
bation." The judiciary, in effect, determines whether the condition
"does in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public
safety."34 Thus, after a condition is found to satisfy a reasonably
related test, it should be "narrowly tailored to interfere as little as
possible with [constitutional liberties]. ' 35 "Reasonable means" have
been defined as "moderate, not excessive, not extreme, not de-
manding too much, well balanced. '3 6
2. The "Necessary" Standard
Some courts apply even more demanding scrutiny when a con-
dition of probation threatens a right deemed fundamental. 37 In
People v. Pointer,38 a California court subjected a condition of
probation imposing birth control to a "necessary" standard. 39 A
necessary standard requires not only that the condition be a rea-
sonable way to facilitate the objectives of probation, but that it
must also be the least restrictive alternative to reach those ends.40
3. Balancing Competing Interests
Another possible approach is to balance the state's interest in
conditioning probation against the probationer's liberty interest. In
United States v. Lowe,4' the Ninth Circuit reviewed a condition of
probation prohibiting the defendants from entering upon public or
private property within 250 feet of a naval base. 42 The majority
held that the condition satisfied a "reasonably related" test because
32 See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
33 Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
3, Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265.
31 Bauer, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
" See, e.g., People v. Arvanites, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493, 500 (Ct. App. 1971) (noting that
if a constitutional right is infringed, the court must determine that no viable alternative to
the probation condition exists).
" 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
1, See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984).
40 Id.
" 654 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1981). In Lowe, the defendants were convicted of
trespassing on a naval base during an anti-nuclear weapons demonstration.
42 See id. at 565.
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the defendants had been convicted of trespass at a nuclear facility. 43
The dissent, however, stated that in addition to finding the condi-
tion reasonable, the court should have more narrowly construed
the permissible relationship between the condition and the purpose
of probation. 44 The dissent proposed a balancing test. The purposes
of probation are rehabilitation and protection of the public; 45 be-
cause the offense was trespass, a condition restricting freedom of
speech and association to a particular area would provide only
marginal protection for society.46 Likewise, the condition would
have no bearing on rehabilitation.47 When balanced against the
freedoms of speech and association, the condition, according to the
dissent, should have been found invalid. 48 Although more exacting
than a reasonableness standard, this approach is less demanding
than a necessary standard.
Another appellate court has adopted a balancing test similar to
the one proposed by the dissent in Lowe. In Oyoghok v. Munici-
pality of Anchorage,49 the court considered the validity of a con-
dition of probation restricting the permissible area of travel for a
convicted prostitute.50 After balancing the defendant's constitutional
rights against the objectives of probation, the majority upheld the
condition.51 However, Justice Singleton, in a concurring opinion,
suggested a less demanding standard: "I fear that the approach
taken unduly dignifies Ms. Oyoghok's constitutional arguments and
41 See id. at 567-68. The court adopted what may be called the Tonry test. In United
States v. Tonry, the Fifth Circuit examined the following factors in determining whether
probation conditions are "unduly intrusive on constitutionally protected freedoms: ... (1)
the purposes sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional tights
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate
needs of law enforcement." United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979)
(quoting United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978)).
Lowe, 654 F.2d at 569 (Boochever, J., dissenting) ("Here we must balance the
probational benefits against the restriction on the exercise of First Amendment rights."); see
also Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d at 265 (disallowing as a condition of probation that
defendant submit to searches without a warrant). According to the terminology used in this
Note, the majority test would be a reasonableness standard.
41 Lowe, 654 F.2d at 569.
4 Id.
47 Id.
" See id.
49 641 P.2d 1267 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
,a See Oyoghok v. Municipality of Anchorage, 641 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982).
"' See id. at 1270.
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in so doing, obscures the issue in this case .... I believe these
principles [the 'reasonably related' test] dispose of the case.
' 52
4. A Proposal for a More Coherent Approach
The confusion in imposing conditions on probation is apparent.
Considering the importance of the subject area, a more coherent
approach is desirable. For the purposes of this Note, the specific
"reasonably related" test adopted by each jurisdiction is irrelevant
because the more demanding analysis is the additional level of
scrutiny afforded in situations involving constitutional rights.53
Therefore, the validity of a condition of probation truly hinges on
the additional level of scrutiny imposed.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a probationer has a
reduced liberty interest.54 In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 5 the Court, in
dicta, stated: "To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of
probationers ... that they do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty
properly depending on the observance of special [probation] res-
trictions."'56
Griffin involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to a statutory
probation condition that required the probationer to subject his
home to warrantless searches by a probation officer.5 7 The Court
held that the condition did not violate the reasonable grounds
standard of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pur-
suant to a valid rule regulating probationers.58 This holding was
premised on the probationer being convicted of a crime and the
probation officer's discretion being curtailed. 59 In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Blackmun suggested that such a condition be subjected
to a "necessary" standard. 60 The majority, however, did not adopt
this standard.61
S:2 Id. at 1271.
3 See Greenberg, supra note 19, at 85.
' See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1979).
55 483 U.S. 868 (1979).
6 Id. at 874 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972)).
5, See id. at 872.
3 See id. at 872-73.
5' See id. at 874. The Court noted: "A State's operation of a probation system ...
presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from
the usual warrant and probable cause requirements." Id. at 873-74.
0 See id. at 884-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61 See id. at 879-80.
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Based upon the Supreme Court's recognition that probationers
are not entitled to the full liberties of ordinary citizens, 62 the correct
test for determining the validity of a condition of probation that
implicates a constitutional right is a balancing test.63 Determining
validity based exclusively on a "reasonably related" test is errone-
ous because Griffin recognized that probationers do have a liberty
interest, reduced but not extinguished. Failing to subject conditions
of probation to any additional scrutiny is to ignore the continued
vitality of probationers' constitutional rights.
Likewise, the "reasonableness" standard fails to safeguard ad-
.equately the probationer's remaining liberty interests. The standard
does not take into account that the Supreme Court values some
rights more highly than others.64 The balancing test allows for this
by specifically focusing on the right impinged by the condition of
probation. A right deemed fundamental, e.g., the right to procre-
ative liberty, would require that the state's interest be more weighty.
Therefore, the balance reflects the nature of the right.
Furthermore, Pointer is wrongly decided. To require that the
condition of probation be the least restrictive alternative errs in the
opposite direction by ignoring the fact that probationers' liberty
interests are diminished. 6 A condition of probation should be sub-
jected to a level of scrutiny that reflects this reduced interest. A
least restrictive alternative analysis subjects the condition to the
same level of scrutiny that would be applied if the condition were
imposed on an innocent citizen. 6
II. APPELLATE TREATMENT OF THE IMPOSITION oF BrTH CONTROL
AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
A. People v. Pointer
Appellate decisions67 evaluating the validity of court imposed
birth control reflect the confusion that has developed in the area
See id. at 874.
6 See also supra note 44 and accompanying text. For a related view, see Greenberg,
supra note 19, at 93, which proposes the same approach.
64 See infra note 94.
- See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
6 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964) (.'[G]overnment purpose...
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms."') (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1958)).
6 See supra note 1 I.-
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of probational conditions., All of the decisions, however, adopt
the Dominguez test to determine whether a condition is reasonably
related to the crime committed or future criminality 9 In People v.
Pointer,7 ° a mother of two children was convicted of the felony of
child endangerment. The defendant, a strict adherent of a macro-
biotic diet,71 imposed that course on her children. Despite repeated
advice from her doctors that such a diet was hazardous to her
children, the defendant refused to change it. When the mother was
forced to take the youngest child, two years old, to the hospital,
the child was "emaciated, semicomatose, and in a state of shock,
... dying."2
7 2
The defendant was convicted of child endangerment, and a
condition of probation was that she not conceive.73 Applying the
modified Dominguez test, the court concluded that this condition
satisfied the "reasonably related" standard. 74 The court based this
finding on the premise that the condition bore a reasonable relation
to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, or future
criminality, because "the harm sought to be prevented by the trial
court may occur before birth."'75 The court, however, struck down
the condition as invalid because "less restrictive alternatives [were]
available."76
"See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
69 Two Florida cases applied the unmodified Dominguez test, resulting in an inordinate
emphasis on the fact that parenthood is a noncriminal activity. See Howland v. State, 420
So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (footnote omitted) ("We find that the condition
of probation prohibiting appellant from fathering a child does not reasonably relate to the
crime of child abuse and relates to noncriminal conduct."); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d
7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("The conditions relating to marriage and pregnancy have
no relationship to the crime of child abuse, and relate to noncriminal conduct.").
70 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984). The Pointer case will serve as the primary
vehicle to analyze the area of law, as the decision is well reasoned and raises several relevant
issues.
, A macrobiotic diet is described as "pretty much exclusively grains, beans and
vegetables, ... excluding fruits, deemphasizing salads, deemphasizing or eliminating milk
products of all form[s] ... and no fish, meat, poultry or eggs." Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at
359 n.2.
Id. at 360.
See id. at 359.
7' See id. at 364. Usually, the harms of child abuse can be prevented sufficiently by
removing the child from the parent. Yet, in Pointer, a child could be harmed by the
macrobiotic diet before birth.
75 Id. This reasoning distinguishes Pointer from the rest of the cases imposing birth
control. Other decisions conclude that a condition imposing birth control bears no reasonable
relation to the crime of child abuse or future criminality. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d
7; State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
76 Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 366. For a discussion of this "necessary" standard, see
supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Decisions
In State v. Mosburg,n the defendant was found guilty of child
endangerment for abandoning her child shortly after birth.78 As a
condition of probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to
refrain from becoming pregnant during the probation period.7 9 The
appeals court, implicitly relying on a balancing test, concluded that
the condition of probation unduly intruded on the probationer's
right of privacy.80
The Florida District Court of Appeal considered the validity of
a condition of probation prohibiting marriage, pregnancy, and cus-
tody of children in Rodriguez v. State.81 The court in Rodriguez
relied exclusively on a "reasonably related" test to determine the
validity of the condition. s2 The court stated: "We thus have no
constitutional difficulty with the conditions imposed, if they are
otherwise valid conditions." 83 The Florida court confirmed its po-
sition in Howland v. State.84 Both Rodriguez and Howland suggest
that imposing birth control as a condition of probation may be
reasonably related to future criminality.85
III. ExAMniNG a COMPETING INTERESTS
Before an inquiry into the "constitutional limitations' 8 6 on a
condition of probation can be made, the condition must satisfy the
"reasonably related" test.8 A child abuser acts in a manner that
society deems reprehensible. The object of this action is a child.
Although the act of conceiving a child is not related to the offensive
768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
See State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 313-14 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
79 Id. at 314.
11 See id. at 315. The court's decision implied that a balance was struck between
Mosburg's right of privacy and the state's interest in conditioning probation. For an analysis
of the "balancing test," see supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
See id. at 9-10.
Id. at 9; see also Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1337 (citations omitted) ("Reasonableness
is the test of the propriety of the conditions of probation.").
4420 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that condition of probation
of not fathering a child could relate to future criminality, the crime of child abuse, but
would not be valid in this case because defendant was prohibited from having contact with
his child or from residing with a child under the age of sixteen).
5 However, both decisions found that future criminality was sufficiently precluded by
preventing the defendant involved from having custody of the child.
" See Note, supra note 19, at 181.
"See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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conduct, the result, the newborn, is related as a potential victim.
Prohibiting a convicted armed robber from owning firearms has
been a condition of probation and has been found to be reasonably
related to the prevention of future criminality." Yet in those in-
stances, the crime was armed robbery, not purchasing a gun. The
objective is to remove the probationer from conditions likely to
result in future criminal behavior, thus protecting society and the
victim.
Imposing a condition of birth control on a convicted child
abuser is analogous. The condition may prevent the convicted child
abuser from being in a position where abuse is possible, and there-
fore, may prevent future criminality.8 9 Under a modified Dominguez
analysis, the condition is reasonably related to society's goal. 9° The
next level of inquiry is to weigh the child abuser's interest against
the benefits derived from imposing birth control as a condition of
probation.
A. The Probationer's Interest
A condition of probation that prohibits a defendant from hav-
ing a child during the term of probation implicates at least two
constitutional guaranties-procreative liberty9' and personal auton-
omy.92 Additionally, a court may consider whether the condition is
" See, e.g., State v. Jameson, 541 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1975) (requiring convicted armed
robber to refrain from possessing firearms as a condition of probation not questioned by
court). In fact, courts regularly validate conditions of probation restricting access to firearms.
See, e.g., State v. Parker, 286 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding a condition that
defendant refrain from possessing firearms after defendant was found guilty of sawing down
a light pole).
9 See Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("Moreover,
we find that although this condition of probation could reasonably relate to future crimi-
nality-i.e., child abuse-it could do so only if appellant had custody of the child or was
permitted to have contact with the child.").
9See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
11 The Supreme Court has declared the right to bear offspring to be "one of the basic
civil rights of man." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Specifically, Justice
Brennan has stated, "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (plurality opinion).
92 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990), the majority opinion, in dicta, found a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
life-sustaining medical treatment. See id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 2851. Likewise, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that "the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body
repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at
2856 (concurring opinion). The Court, however, refused to label this right fundamental. Id.
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cruel and unusual punishment. 9 This Note's analysis will focus on
the right of procreative liberty because restrictions on this interest
are subjected to a more stringent level of scrutiny.94
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a fundamental
right of procreative liberty. 95 The realm of procreative liberties is
not, however, completely free of state intervention. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Blackmun stated in Roe v. Wade:96
The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowl-
edge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is
appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert impor-
tant interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical stan-
dards, and in protecting potential life.97
In determining whether a state's intrusion is appropriate, the
government must meet two standards. First, the state's interest must
be compelling, and second, the intrusion "must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." 9 The Su-
preme Court's recognition of a reduced privacy expectation for
probationers," however, suggests that a less stringent analysis may
at , 110 S. Ct. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The significance of failing to label
such a right fundamental is that the state's intrusion is subjected to a less demanding test:
the Court merely balances the individual's constitutional rights against the relevant state
interests.
91 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The
Supreme Court has stated that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). However, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989), the Court
stated: "The punishment is either 'cruel and unusual' . . . or it is not. The audience for
these arguments, in other words, is not this Court but the citizenry of the United States."
This statement suggests that the political process is the appropriate arena for such a deter-
mination.
9 Because procreative liberty is deemed a fundamental right, see infra note 95 and
accompanying text, courts impose a very high level of scrutiny on state action interfering
with it. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. Courts, however, impose a less demanding
standard when a state intrudes on a lesser right, such as an individual's right of bodily
integrity. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
The origin of this right is unclear. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
the Court held that the liberty guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment "[w]ithout doubt...
denotes.., the right of the individual.., to marry, establish a home and bring up children."
Recently, the right of procreative liberty has been associated more with the right of privacy.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). Likewise, the Court rejected the argument
"that the woman's right [of privacy] is absolute." Id. at 153.
Id. at 155.
" See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1979); supra notes 54-63 and accom-
panying text.
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be appropriate when a state limits probationers' procreative liber-
ties.
In addition, a persuasive argument has been made by one author
that the right to procreate, even regarding non-probationers, is a
limited right.1 ° Onora O'Neill suggests that the right to procreate
means more than the right to bear children; it means a right to
become a parent, "where being a parent includes rearing as well as
begetting or bearing children, and is sometimes confined to rearing
without biological reproduction. '" 101 O'Neill concludes "that the
right to beget or bear is not unrestricted, but contingent upon
begetters and bearers having or making some feasible plan for their
child to be adequately reared by themselves or by willing others."' 1 2
Therefore, the interest in protecting the child from harm qualifies
the right to procreate. 103
Moreover, O'Neill's argument is even more persuasive when a
parent has previously abused a child. Then, the parent has not only
failed to raise the child adequately but also has affirmatively harmed
the child. It may therefore be argued that the parent should not be
allowed to bear another child until the influences that contributed
to the abuse have been remedied.
B. The State's Interest
The Supreme Court has recognized that probation conditions
are "meant to assure that ... probation serves as a period of
rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the pro-
bationer's being at large."' ° Requiring a probationer found guilty
of child abuse to practice contraception serves the purpose of
rehabilitation by preventing the abuser from having access to po-
ll' See Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing and Rearing, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILO-
sopmcAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25, 25-26 (Onora O'Neill & William
Ruddick eds., 1979).
101 Id. at 25.
' Id.
10 This theory of a limited right to procreate is not unique to O'Neill. See Michael D.
Bayles, Limits to a Right to Procreate, in Enucs AND PoPULATION 42 (Michael D. Bayles
ed., 1976) ("But since human rights are claims, they can be outweighed by other claims.");
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 412 (1983) ("Such a person's interest in conceiving and
bearing does not create a right to procreate because it can be justifiably overridden by the
need to prevent harm to the child."). Robertson, however, criticizes O'Neill's restrictions
because society readily provides alternative caregivers, thus, in effect, eliminating any restric-
tions on the right to procreate absent potential harm to the child. See id.
104 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
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tential victims while social workers counsel the family. 05 Likewise,
the treatment program may be more successful if the pressures of
parenthood are removed.' ° Furthermore, increasingly, abusive par-
ents are young and suffer from substance abuse; °7 removal of the
pressures of parenthood may allow the abusive parents time to
mature and resolve chemical dependence.
Another interest of the state in conditioning probation is societal
protection. Society receives multiple benefits from safeguarding its
children. 08 However, the focus of the state should be in preventing
child abuse, not simply intervening after the abuse has occurred.' °9
Studies suggest high recidivism in child abuse cases." 0 Therefore, if
a child abuser has another child, the new offspring may also be
abused. In addition, if the existing child should be returned to the
abusive parent, statistics suggest that imposing birth control may
benefit that child."'
10 Robert W. ten Bensel, The Scope of the Problem, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Winter 1984-
85, at 1, 5 ("The goal of this process [intervention and prevention] is to protect the child
and improve the parents' capacity for responsible child care and thereby meet the basic needs
of the child.").
'1 Many studies indicate a correlation between stress and child abuse. See, e.g., Mindy
S. Rosenberg & N. Dickon Reppucci, Abusive Mothers: Perceptions of Their Own and Their
Children's Behavior, 51 J. OF CONsuL~mr & CmnCAL PsYcHoL. 674, 675 (1983) (citations
omitted) ("It appears that the accumulation of many stressors, rather than isolated stressful
incidents, can precipitate abusive behavior."); Michael S. Wald & Sophia Cohen, Preventing
Child Abuse-What Will It Take?, 20 FAm. L.Q. 281, 286 (1986-87) (citation omitted) ("In
general, stress seems to increase the risk of maltreatment among individuals whom we might
already consider to be at risk based upon personal history, or personality traits.").
,07 See Suzanne Salzinger et al., Risk for Physical Child Abuse and the Personal
Consequences for its Victims, 18 Cams. Jusr. & BEAav. 64, 67 (1991).
,0, One commentator has expressed this interest as follows: "More generally, the public
has a legitimate concern with the selection of child rearers and with the way in which children
are reared, because a society's children are its future citizens and the future contributors to
its material, cultural, and moral advancement. Collectively, children are a social asset."
Jeffery Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAviNG CroDREN: PnmosoPmCAL
AND LEoAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD, supra note 100, at 115, 119. In addition, child
abuse is a costly problem. For fiscal year 1991, the Orange County, California, child abuse
prevention budget was 35.8 million dollars. Carla Rivera, What's Best for the Children?,
L.A. Tnms, Oct. 26, 1991, at B1.
,' This tendency has been summarized as follows:
With respect to child abuse, intervention by courts and child protection agencies
after the fact often is an inadequate response: the child may have suffered
significant harm, and it is much more difficult to alter the parent's behavior
once a pattern of abuse has begun. Not surprisingly, this has led many com-
mentators to seek ways of preventing child maltreatment.
Michael J. Sandmire & Michael S. Wald, Licensing Parents-A Response to Claudia Mangel's
Proposal, 24 FAm. L.Q. 53, 53 (1990-91).
110 One commentator suggests a "conservative estimate is that reabuse occurs in at least
half of all cases." Wald & Cohen, supra note 106, at 281 n.1.
" Additional children increase time demands and pressures, thus increasing the possi-
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CONCLUSION
In balancing the state's concerns against the probationer's in-
terest in procreative liberty, it is beneficial to consider the state's
alternative means of achieving the goals of probation. If we consider
the alternative proposed by People v. Pointer,12 namely, removal
of the child from the mother's custody after birth, the cost of
rearing the child becomes society's burden." 3 This alternative also
expects the probationer to "periodically submit to pregnancy test-
ing; and .. .upon becoming pregnant ... require[s her] to follow
an intensive prenatal and neonatal treatment program monitored
by both the probation officer and by a supervising physician.
' 4
In Pointer, the court concluded that this alternative is less onerous
than court-imposed contraception. Careful consideration, however,
reveals that these conditions would be a greater intrusion on the
probationer's liberty than imposing birth control for the term of
probation. In addition, it may be more difficult for the probationer
to give up a child than not to have a child at all.
It is also beneficial to consider the success of more traditional
methods of preventing child abuse. Douglas Besharov, a leading
expert, estimates that approximately twenty-five percent of all child
deaths resulting from abuse or neglect involve children whose situa-
bility of abuse. United States Department of Health and Human Services statistics indicate
that children in families with four or more children "showed higher rates of maltreatment"
and were "more likely to be ... endangered." NATIONAL STUMY, supra note 2, at 5-35.
Moreover, instances of maltreatment in families with four or more children "were localized
in the areas of physical abuse and physical neglect." Id. This may be the result of additional
stress resulting from more children. For a discussion of the correlation between stress and
child abuse, see supra note 106.
"2 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984). In Pointer, the court observed that if the
defendant becomes pregnant her options are (1) to reveal the pregnancy and be imprisoned,
(2) to conceal the condition and forgo prenatal care, or (3) to seek an abortion. See id. at
366. This is a valid concern. Although the defendant has the right to choose abortion, the
condition forbids conception, not birth. Therefore, the defendant would be subject to
imprisonment even without termination of pregnancy. This diminishes the positive effect of
choosing abortion. From a practical aspect, however, it is highly unlikely that the court
would discover the abortion. Likewise, periodic visitation by a probation officer diminishes
the possibility that the pregnancy would remain undetected for a significant amount of time.
See id. at 365.
-' This proposal also deforms the concept of procreative liberty. O'Neill offers the
following illustration: "Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his mistress had five children, whom they
took as infants to the foundling hospital and abandoned there. If we believe that persons
have an unrestricted right to procreate, then Jean-Jacques and Therese acted within their
rights." O'Neill, supra note 100, at 25.
114 Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
1052 [VOL. 80
PROBATIONARY CONDITIONS
tions were already known to a child protection agency. 115 This
study and the high rate of recidivism'16 suggest that the current
system is not working.
Considering the lack of success of traditional methods of pre-
venting child abuse, and the alternatives available, the balance must
be struck in favor of imposing contraception as a condition of
probation. Although procreative liberty is deemed a "fundamental
right," this probation condition is defensible in light of a proba-
tioner's reduced expectancy of liberty and the state's interest in
rehabilitating the offender while protecting society. In addition,
conditioning probation by imposing birth control on a convicted
child abuser informs all abusers that child abuse is a serious crime
that will not be tolerated.
117
In short, something must be done about child abuse. Current
methods have proved ineffectual, requiring novel approaches. Im-
posing birth control as a condition of probation is one such ap-
proach.
Thomas E. Bartrum
' See Douglas J. Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems and
Future Directions, 17 Fm. L.Q. 151, 163 (1983-84).
",6 See supra note 110.
"7 One study indicates that child abuse is more likely to occur
when it results in low probability of negative consequences or leads to positive
ones. Child maltreatment has been seen as being fostered by societal views
regarding childrearing. The use of physical punishment by parents is sanctioned
by societal values and the majority of parents at some time engage in physical
punishment as a means of handling their children's behavior. The maltreating
parent may, therefore, see his or her behavior as being within culturally ap-
proved limits, despite its being extreme in nature. In addition, since physical
punishment often terminates an aversive child behavior (at least in the short
run), it also may be seen as increasing a parent's sense of self-efficacy (e.g.,
reinforcing). Aggression is most persistent when it is reinforced intermittently,
which is usually the case in childrearing situations.
Sandra T. Azar, A Framework for Understanding Child Maltreatment: An Integration of
Cognitive Behavioral and Developmental Perspectives, 18 C. A ANr J. op BEHAv. ScmNcE
340, 348-49 (1986).
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